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Applying Daubert Inconsistently?
PROOF OF INDIVIDUAL CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT
AND FORENSIC CASES
Joseph Sanders†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 ushered
in a new era in the assessment of expert testimony. Daubert
and its two companion cases in the “Daubert trilogy,” General
Electric v. Joiner2 and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,3 drastically
altered the law governing the admissibility of expert evidence.4
In the federal courts and in a substantial majority of state
courts, the old Frye rule was swept aside for a new,
multifaceted test.5 All three of these cases involved a causal
†

Thanks to Edward Cheng for helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am
particularly honored to be part of a festschrift for Margaret Berger. One anecdote tells
all. Not long after the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceutical, Margaret and I each published an article in the Minnesota Law
Review. Our articles were grouped together as a “special issue” on Daubert. One of my
colleagues later jokingly commented that I must be special to be one half of an entire
special issue. I replied, no, Margaret’s article was the special issue and I tagged along.
By the way, her article, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN.
L. REV. 1345(1994) was an early beacon for judges grappling with this new
admissibility rule.
1
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
3
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4
The Federal Rules of Evidence have been changed to reflect these cases.
Most importantly, Rule 702 now reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (changes in italics).
5
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). According to the Frye
test, scientific evidence should be admitted only when the scientific principle upon
which the expert’s testimony is based is “sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Id. at 1014.
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question and challenges to causal assertions have remained at
the very center of admissibility law. The costs and benefits of
this filter on expert causal assertions has been the source of
considerable controversy.6 One aspect of the controversy is a
concern that the standard is not applied in a consistent manner.
Inconsistency appears in many guises. There is interjurisdictional inconsistency between the federal and state
courts that have adopted Daubert and the state courts that
continue to apply the Frye test.7 Even among jurisdictions
employing the same test, there is substantial variation.8
More worrisome, perhaps, are inconsistencies within
jurisdictions. In this regard, the most frequently discussed
inconsistency is between civil and criminal cases. A number of
people note that courts are more likely to permit causation
experts, especially the state’s experts, to testify in criminal cases
than in civil cases. For example, Professor Berger notes that,
In civil cases, courts engage in rigorous gatekeeping and often exclude
plaintiffs’ experts because the theory underlying their testimony has
not been adequately validated. But I see no sign of a parallel approach
in criminal cases even [where] there are problems with the
assumptions on which the prosecution’s expert testimony rests.9

Others have made similar observations10 and this conclusion is
supported by several empirical studies.11 On the other hand,
6

See generally Symposium, A Cross-Disciplinary Look at Scientific Truth:
What’s the Law to Do?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 847 (2008).
7
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923). See David E.
Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J.
351 (2004); John M. Conley &, Scott W. Gaylord, Scientific Evidence in the State
Courts: Daubert and the Problem of Outcomes, 44 NO. 4 JUDGES’ J. 6, 6 (2005).
8
For example, within both Frye and Daubert jurisdictions differences exist
as to whether the admissibility decision should be restricted to novel scientific
evidence; whether courts should distinguish between scientific evidence and other
types of expert testimony, and, if so, what test should be employed for experience
testimony. See generally David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule”
and Other Oddities and Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, the Scientific Revolution, and
Common Sense, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 699 (2008); Joseph Sanders, Daubert, Frye, And the
States: Thoughts on the Choice of a Standard, in POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE
WHOLE TRUTH? EXPERTS, EVIDENCE, AND THE BLINDFOLDING OF THE JURY 5 (2007),
available at http://poundinstitute org/images/2006ForumReport.pdf.
9
Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003).
10
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1072-73 (2003) (discussing difference between civil and
criminal applications of Daubert standard); Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of
Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 105, 109-10 (2003).
11
See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility
of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
339, 364 (2002) (“[T]he Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of
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many have argued that the admissibility bar is set too high on
the civil side.12
In this article, I argue that we misunderstand the
nature and cause of the inconsistency when we lump together
all toxic tort cases and compare them to all forensic cases. If we
disaggregate the toxic tort admissibility opinions that deal with
general questions (e.g., whether asbestos causes lung cancer),
and those that deal with causal questions that relate to the
individual plaintiff, we see that experts testifying on the latter
causal question are judged by admissibility standards that are
nearly as liberal as the standards applied in forensic cases. On
the other hand, with respect to one type of forensic proof, DNA
testimony, the courts impose an admissibility standard at least
as high as that used for general causation cases in toxic torts.
It is the thesis of this article that the liberal standards
applied with respect to specific causation and forensic experts
have a similar source. They are the result of a gulf between the
needs of the law and the products of science and they reflect a
judiciary grappling with—or, in the forensic context, sometimes
refusing to grapple with—the difficulties this presents for
expert witness admissibility standards.13

expert testimony at either the trial or appellate court levels.”); D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 103-12 (2000) (providing empirical evidence that judges are
more likely to admit prosecution expert testimony than other types of expert testimony).
For a review of the empirical findings, see Faigman, supra note 8, at 717-18.
12
Among the critical articles are: Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M.
Capone, Admissibility Standards as Politics—The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 1025 (2003); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between
Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 324 (2001); Margaret A. Berger
& Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104
MICH. L. REV. 257 (2005); Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance
and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability
Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 15 (2001); Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the
Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role
to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 337 (1999); Allan Kanner &
M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281
(2007); Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and Summary Judgment, 29 J.
LEGAL MED. 307 (2008).
13
After I had completed this article, David Faigman shared with me his
contribution to this festschrift. His article, Evidentiary Incommensurability: A
Preliminary Exploration of the Problem of Reasoning from General Scientific Data to
Individualized Legal Decision Making, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115 (2010), makes many of
the points I make in this article concerning the gulf between the causal generalizations
of most scientific inquiry and the specific causal analyses required in individual trials.
See also DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE
LAW 69 (1999).
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In Part II, I describe the gulf between the search for
generalities in science and the need for particulars in law. In
Parts III and IV, I discuss the effect of this gulf, first with
respect to toxic tort “specific causation” experts and, second,
with respect to forensic experts. In both areas, the relative
weakness of the available empirical evidence leads courts to
adopt liberal admissibility standards. Part V briefly
summarizes the discussion in the previous two sections. Part
VI argues that the liberal admissibility standards applied in
these two areas are but two instantiations of law’s general
contextual approach to knowledge.14 By and large, this
contextual approach serves the legal system well, but in some
situations it produces less than optimal levels of expertise. This
occurs because the courts fail to adopt a contextual approach
that attends to the future as well as to the case being decided. I
outline the circumstances in which a longer view may serve us
well and argue that those circumstances exist in the forensic
arena. Part VII discusses alternatives open to the courts if they
wish to adopt this longer view. The article ends with a brief
summary of the argument.
II.

THE SCIENCE-LAW DISCONNECT

There is a disconnect between science and law, and this
disconnect helps to explain how law approaches certain types of
causal questions. The disconnect is simply this: the law’s
search for causal information about a particular case often
finds little or no help from science. In order to understand this
problem, I need to say a bit about the scientific enterprise.
Those who study the doing of science would generally agree
that there is no special “scientific method” that is different
from and better than other ways of understanding the world.15
However, science is chock full of specific theories and
methodological prescriptions concerning how to test these
14

A contextual approach varies the justification needed to hold a belief
depending upon the quantity and quality of the available evidence.
15
As Susan Haack notes:
What is distinctive about natural-scientific inquiry isn’t that it uses a
particular mode or modes of inference, but the vast range of helps to inquiry
scientists have developed, many of them B specific instruments, specific kinds
of precaution against experimental error, specific models and metaphors B
local to this or that field or sub-discipline.
SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND
CYNICISM 167 (2003).
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theories. A substantial part of having what passes for scientific
expertise in a field is an ability to understand and use the tools
of the trade.
Susan Haack divides these aids to understanding into
several categories, including helps to the senses and helps to
reasoning.16 Instruments that expand our senses are at the very
heart of progress in physics, astronomy, chemistry, and biology
as well as practical disciplines such as medicine and
engineering. Aids to reasoning are also critical. These include
mathematics in its many different forms as well as experimental
and quasi-experimental designs and other investigatory devices
designed to assist in making causal assertions.17
For purposes of this article, I focus on the second set of
aids: aids to reasoning. Most of the common mathematical and
logical aids to reasoning employed by science are designed to
facilitate not simply inquiry, but inquiry of a certain type:
inquiry into general laws or principles. This does not mean that
scientists are uninterested in the particular case; many
scientists and individuals in fields that rely on science, such as
engineering, devote most of their energy to specific situations.
But the heroes of science are those who are able to put forth
explanations in terms of general laws that explain a myriad of
particular observations.
This interest in the general and the generalizable leads
to a second component of scientific conventions, the lack of a
timetable. An inquiry takes as long as it takes and with respect
to many questions the answer experts are most comfortable
with is, “we don’t know.” “We don’t know” does not necessarily
mean that we don’t have a guess. Often it means we do not
16

Id. at 98.
See WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL,
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL
INFERENCE (2002). Even the social sciences play an important role in this process when
they uncover and document the many systematic reasoning errors that result from
judgment by heuristics and then suggest affirmative steps we might take to minimize
such errors. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1059 (2000).
A third set of aids discussed by Haack are helps to evidence sharing and
intellectual honesty. This includes things such as peer review, publication, replication
of findings and other formal and informal devices that involve scientists looking over
each other’s shoulders. Often this peek over the shoulder focuses on the correct use of
the first two types of aids; instruments, mathematics and experimental design. All of
these aids are fallible and none guarantees that we will arrive at correct outcomes.
From the supposed benefits of bleeding to the more recent realization that many ulcers
have a bacteriological, not a psychological source, it is easy to point to occasions where
we have been lead astray for lengthy periods of time. Collectively, however, these
conventions are thought to facilitate inquiry over the long term.
17
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have enough evidence of the kind we find persuasive to support
a conclusion about a phenomenon.18
If science tends to focus on systematic and general
knowledge, most trials must deal with specific events. To be sure,
law often is concerned with general questions, e.g., does drug X
cause injury Y? However, it is also nearly always concerned with
what happened to a specific person at a particular point in time.
Did drug X cause the plaintiff’s injury? Were these fingerprints
left at the crime scene those of the defendant?
This inquiry into individual causation is accompanied
by a mindset that is contrary to the “wait and see” attitude of
science. Legal conventions ask experts to make a decision now
based on the evidence at hand.19 Fred Prichard quotes the
following passage from an expert confronting for the first time
the law’s push for a decision now.
Bill (the expert’s attorney) asked me a question about whether the
belt was on or not, the lap belt. And I said, “Well, could have been.
But then, it may not have been.” Woo, rockets went off. “What do you
mean? You’re my expert in this case, and you say it ‘could be’ or
‘couldn’t be?’ Look, I’m going to tell you. The other side doesn’t
waffle. They pick one view. And they will push that view. And they
will make their case in front of a jury. And there will be no
misunderstanding. There will be no gray area. They will take a
position one way or the other and make it stick. Now, they don’t
have any other course of action. That’s their life. They make their
living going in front of juries and making statements, whether they
have facts to back them up or not. Now you, you can go back to
designing cars. You have another career. They don’t. You better start
thinking like they do.”20

This anecdotal evidence is supported by survey
research. Champagne et al. report that 56% of the experts they

18

When a community of investigators say this they are referring to evidence
which is derived from the application of the aids to reasoning (and the instruments) to
which a field of inquiry is committed. There may not be a “scientific method” writ large,
but there are methods and aids to inquiry to which communities of scholars are
committed and evidence derived from these techniques enjoy greater warrant in the
community than other types of evidence. Over time, these methods may change as new
ways to collect and observe are created. Methods are, ultimately, simply tools and a
new problem may call for new tools. In this sense, methodology is a pragmatic search
for what works. However, at any given point in time the ability of an investigator to
persuade her peers about some hypothesis without the use of these devices and
methods is limited.
19
Herbert Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting
Norms in the Courtroom, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 48 (2009).
20
FRED PRICHARD, EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES: AN INSIDE VIEW 30-31 (2005).
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interviewed say their lawyers ask them to be less tentative.21
They found a similar percentage (57%) in a second, follow-up
study.22 Perhaps more alarmingly, 12% of the experts in the
first study and 22% in the second study agreed with the
statement that lawyers try to get their experts to testify to
issues for which there is no scientific basis.23
How then should we summarize the conventions of
science and law? Three scientific conventions are particularly
relevant to this discussion: a) searching for the general and
theoretical, b) doing so by employing the methods and
techniques accepted by one’s field, and c) an attitude of
agnosticism that encourages waiting for persuasive evidence
before making up one’s mind.24 On the other hand, legal
conventions: a) often focus on the specific event and b) push
witnesses toward arriving at a conclusion.25
For the moment, I wish to set aside the second
difference, science’s wait-and-see attitude versus the law’s
desire to arrive at a conclusion, and focus on the first
difference. The fact that much of science focuses on
understanding the general, while law is usually interested in
the specific, does not always present difficulties. In some areas,
the translation from the general to the specific is so well
understood that one can reach nearly unanimous consensus
about the cause of a specific event through the application of
general principles. Engineering is often a case in point. For
example, there were multiple hypotheses as to why the I-35
bridge across the Mississippi River at Minneapolis suffered a
catastrophic collapse on August 1, 2007.26 They included metal
21

Anthony Champagne, Daniel Shuman & Elizabeth Whitaker, An
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31
JURIMETRICS J. 375, 385 (1991).
22
Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three
City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 201 (1994).
23
Id.; Champagne et al., supra note 21, at 385.
24
A fourth scientific convention is “a commitment to sharing data,
intellectual honesty, and disinterestedness.” Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, And The
Expert Witness, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (2009). I discuss this convention and
how it differs from the legal view of expert knowledge as a partisan resource. I do not
explore this difference in the present article.
25
Note that the second element in scientific conventions, a commitment to
the methods and techniques of inquiry accepted by one’s field, has no direct parallel in
legal conventions. I return to this point later in the article. See infra Part VI.
26
See Press Release, National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB
Determines Inadequate Load Capacity Due to Design Errors of Gusset Plates Caused I35 Bridge to Collapse (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2008/
081114.html [hereinafter NTSB Press Release]; see also Stephen Flynn, Minn. Bridge
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fatigue among other options.27 However, in November 2008, the
National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the
primary source of the failure was a design flaw.28 The bridge
gusset plates were approximately half as thick as they should
have been.29 This failure, combined with substantial increases
in the weight of the bridge from earlier modifications and the
storage of tons of construction material on the bridge at the
time of collapse, caused the failure.30 Engineers were able to work
from the general, e.g., the load bearing capacity of various
materials and designs, to the specific flaw in this particular bridge.
Unfortunately, this easy ability to understand the
general case and then to translate from the general to the
specific case is precisely what is absent in many civil and
criminal cases.31 Whatever the evidence concerning the general
principle, e.g., that Vioxx causes heart problems or that
individual fingerprints are unique, translating this to the
particular case is fraught with difficulty. In the next two
sections, I discuss this problem first in the civil context and
then in the criminal context.
III.

ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS IN TOXIC TORT CASES

In no area has the Daubert revolution had a greater
effect than in toxic torts. The number of cases in which expert
causation testimony has been excluded must by now run into
the thousands. Many commentators have reacted negatively to
this trend, arguing that the bar has been set too high.32

Collapse Reveals Brittle America: Expert Op-Ed, POPULAR MECHANICS, Aug. 2, 2007,
available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/transportation/421998.html;
Minnesota: Cause of Bridge Collapse is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at A20.
27
Id.
28
See NTSB Press Release, supra note 26; see also Matthew L. Wald, Bridge
Collapse is Laid to Design Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at A19.
29
See NTSB Press Release, supra note 26.
30
Id.
31
This ability is not absent in all cases. DNA testing is an area where the
transition from the general to the individual case is well understood. This is also true
with respect to toxic torts that produce signature diseases.
32
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. This is especially troublesome to
critics when the exclusion of the expert testimony results in a summary judgment for
the defendant because the plaintiff no longer has any admissible evidence on causation.
Clearly, the bar is higher than it once was. Before Daubert, very few cases
were concluded as a result of an expert witness admissibility determination. The
Bendectin litigation, of which Daubert is a part, is a good example. Almost all the
twenty-five or so Bendectin cases that were heard on the merits were tried to either a
judge or a jury. Although the plaintiffs never prevailed in any of these cases, this was
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I do not engage in this debate. Rather, I argue that the
height of the bar depends on the causal question being
addressed. The causal question in toxic tort cases is usually
divided into two parts: general causation and specific
causation. The general causation question is whether a
substance or drug has been shown to harm any individuals.
The specific causation question is whether the harm suffered
by the plaintiff was caused by the substance or the drug in
question.33 When evidence is excluded, is it usually because of a
failure to present reliable evidence on general causation or a
failure to present reliable evidence on specific causation?
Unfortunately, the question is easier to pose than it is to
answer. Within the toxic tort arena, most specific causation
testimony is presented as “differential diagnosis” testimony.34
But one cannot judge the frequency with which specific
causation testimony is excluded simply by looking at the
frequently with which “differential diagnosis” testimony is
excluded. This is because most Daubert opinions rule on
general causation before reaching the question of specific
causation. They require plaintiffs to “rule in” the alleged causal
agent, i.e., they must show that the agent causes the injury to
some individuals, before “ruling out” other possible causes.35
the result of defense verdicts or judicial reversal of plaintiff verdicts. See generally
JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL (1998).
33
For a discussion of these terms, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 28 cmt. c (2005).
34
For discussions of differential diagnosis testimony, see Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony About Differential
Diagnosis (Etiology): Of Under—and Over—Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 391
(2004); Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential
Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective
and Substantive Law, 64 AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2001); Ian S. Spechler,
Physicians at the Gates of Daubert: A Look at the Admissibility of Differential
Diagnosis Testimony to Show External Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 26 REV.
LITIG. 739 (2007). The term is itself problematical. When physicians use this term in
their medical practice they are referring to the process of determining which disease
produced a set of symptoms. However, in the legal arena the term is used to describe a
process by which one searches for the cause of the underlying disease. The latter
exercise might better be called “differential etiology.” Id.
35
In Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, the trial judge made the following comment:
The process of differential diagnosis is undoubtedly important to the question
of “specific causation.” If other possible causes of an injury cannot be ruled
out, or at least the probability of their contribution to causation minimized,
then the “more likely than not” threshold for proving causation may not be
met. But, it is also important to recognize that a fundamental assumption
underlying this method is that the final, suspected “cause” remaining after
this process of elimination must actually be capable of causing the injury.
That is, the expert must “rule in” the suspected cause as well as “rule out”
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Specific causation witnesses are frequently excluded because
neither they nor some other expert has provided sufficient
evidence to “rule in” the suspect substance.36
Once we set those cases aside, that is, once we look only
to the cases where there is evidence of general causation, what
evidence must the expert present in order to survive an
admissibility challenge to the specific causation testimony? The
answer is, not very much.
In some Frye jurisdictions, experts conducting a
differential diagnosis are considered to be “experience experts”37
and are allowed to testify without any reliability filter.38 The
other possible causes. And, of course, expert opinion on this issue of “general
causation” must be derived from a scientifically valid methodology.
892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th
Cir. 1996).
The great majority of all federal cases on point come to the same
conclusion. See 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 21:6 (2009).
36
Sometimes, the “ruling in” analysis focuses on the question of dosage. To
how much of a substance was the plaintiff exposed? This, too, is best thought of as a
question of general causation. See id.
37
Such experts are variously called “experience” experts, “opinion” experts,
or “clinical” experts. David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and The
(Partial) Failures of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451 (2008) (connoisseur
evidence); Faigman, supra note 8 (opinion evidence); Joseph Sanders, Kumho and How
We Know, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 373 (2001) (experience evidence).
Experience evidence is not restricted to civil cases. As several scholars
have noted, much of the testimony of forensic experts may be viewed as experience
evidence. See Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic
Knowledge Claims in the Post-Daubert Era, 43 TULSA L. REV. 263, 276 (2007); Lyn
Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Experiential or Scientific Expertise, 7 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 143 (2008). That is, the experts justify their opinion on the basis of
their experience with respect to the task at hand.
38
For example, in Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiff offered
expert testimony that his wife’s death was “direct[ly] and proximately cause[d]” by her
ingestion of Parlodel, a drug taken to suppress lactation in women who chose not to
nurse their newborn children. 14 P.3d 1170, 1173-75 (Kan. 2000). The defendant
challenged the admissibility of this testimony. Id. at 1180. The Kansas Supreme court
held that the Frye test is not applicable to cases where the expert offers “pure opinion”
testimony. Id. at 1178. “The validity of pure opinion is tested by cross-examination of
the witness.” Id. at 1179. The plaintiff’s three experts offered to testify that Parlodel
caused or contributed to Bishop’s death. Id. at 1175. They arrived at this result
through a process of “differential diagnosis” by which they considered and ruled out
other causes. Id. at 1177. Apparently, Kuhn removes most if not all medical doctor
differential diagnosis testimony from any judicial reliability assessment.
Florida also has adopted this position. In Marsh v. Valyou, echoing Kuhn,
the court concluded that “[i]t is well-established that Frye is inapplicable to ‘pure
opinion’ testimony. . . . [b]ecause testimony causally linking trauma to fibromyalgia is
based on the experts’ experience and training, it is ‘pure opinion’ admissible without
having to satisfy Frye.” 977 So. 2d 543, 548-49 (Fla. 2007).
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted a similar approach to expert
testimony on repressed memory in Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 123 (2000). The
Logerquist court said:
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federal and state courts that have adopted Daubert, refuse to
adopt this approach.39 However, as the following discussion
indicates, they do not apply a strenuous admissibility standard
for specific causation testimony.
What are the admissibility standards? First the expert
must offer more than simple temporal order, i.e., the injury
followed the exposure and, therefore, the exposure caused the
injury.40 Nevertheless, experts continue to offer this as proof of
causation. The very fact that temporal order is so frequently
the basis of exclusion is itself an indication of the relatively low
threshold set for the admissibility of differential diagnosis
testimony for in the context of many long latency period toxic
torts temporal order is nearly no evidence at all.41 Plaintiff
experts may also be excluded if they fail to address and rule out

Although compliance with Frye is necessary when the scientist reaches a
conclusion by applying a scientific theory or process based on the work or
discovery of others, under [Arizona Rules of Evidence 702 and 703] experts
may testify concerning their own experimentation and observation and
opinions based on their own work without first showing general acceptance.
Id. at 123 (quoting State v. Hummert, 933 P.2d 1187, 1195). The Logerquist opinion
was the subject of an issue of the Arizona State Law Journal. See Margaret A. Berger,
When is Clinical Psychology Like Astrology?, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 75 (2001); David L.
Faigman, Embracing the Darkness: Logerquist v. McVey and the Doctrine of Ignorance
of Science Is an Excuse, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 91 (2001); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific
Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 103 (2001); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Logerquist v. McVey: The Majority’s Flawed Procedural Assumptions, 33
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121 (2001).
39
A few Daubert opinions have come close. For example, in Emig. v.
Electrolux Home Products, Inc., the court said:
“It is not appropriate to invoke the Daubert test in cases where expert
testimony is based solely on experience or training, as opposed to a
methodology or technique.” Indeed, where the expert’s opinion is based on
“years of accumulated learning and insight,” the reliability of such opinion
“should be assessed without resort to the Daubert factors.”
No. 06-CV-4791, 2008 WL 4200988, at *7 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 11, 2008) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 949 F. Supp. 171, 177-78 (S.D.N.Y.1996)).
40
See 3 FAIGMAN, ET AL., supra note 35, at § 21:7. See, e.g., Whiting v. Boston
Edison, Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 23 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[Plaintiff’s experts] propound the
argument that . . . because Gary Whiting was exposed to radiation before he contracted
[acute lymphocytic leukemia], his ALL must have been caused by radiation exposure.
This is a classic illustration of the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc.”); Schmaltz
v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“It is well
settled that a causation opinion based solely on a temporal relationship is not derived
from the scientific method and is therefore insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Fed. R. Evid. 702.”).
There are a handful of cases that balk at even this limitation. See
Kannankeril v. Terminis International, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997).
41
Even some of the temporal order cases are, at bottom, about general
causation. See Ervin v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 492 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2007).
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other possible causes. Experts who fail to consider alternatives
are often excluded.42
If, however, experts do avoid these two obvious
inadequacies, their testimony is rarely excluded. When doctors
employ standard diagnostic techniques many courts are likely
to admit their differential diagnosis testimony. The classic
statement of this position comes from the In re Paoli opinion:
“to the extent that a doctor utilizes standard diagnostic
techniques in gathering . . . this information, the more likely
we are to find that the doctor’s methodology is reliable.”43
Moreover, most courts would agree with Paoli that a failure to
account for all possible causes does not render expert opinion
based on differential diagnosis inadmissible.44
John’s Heating Service v. Lamb,45 is a state court opinion
supporting this position:
Of course, “[a] differential diagnosis that fails to take serious account
of other potential causes may be so lacking that it cannot provide a
reliable basis for an opinion on causation.” But here that is not the
case. Here, doctors experienced with carbon monoxide exposure
performed the differential diagnosis, which included making
physical examinations, taking medical history, and reviewing
clinical tests. In addition, the diagnosis was bolstered by a temporal
relationship between the symptoms and the possible carbon
monoxide exposure and the discrepancy between Cynthia’s
performance and verbal IQs corresponding almost uniquely to
carbon monoxide poisoning. An expert’s causation conclusion should
not be excluded because she has not ruled out every possible
alternative; rather, existing possible alternatives should affect the
weight that the jury gives the experts’ testimony.46

42

See Terry v. Ottawa Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental
Delay, 658, 847 N.E.2d 1246 (Oh. Ct. App. 2006) (“We agree with the trial court: Dr.
Bernstein did not conduct a scientifically valid differential diagnosis, because his
method relied primarily upon temporal relationships and because he did not rule out
other possible causes. He was properly barred from testifying to specific causation.”);
see also Roche v. Lincoln Property Co., 278 F.Supp.2d 744 (E.D. Va. 2003) (Plaintiff’s
expert’s testimony that mold caused the plaintiffs’ allergy-like symptoms excluded in
part because he failed “to rule out the Roches’ significant allergies to cats, dust mites,
grasses, weeds, and trees as potential causes for the Roches’ symptoms.” Mrs. Roche
had been to the emergency room on several occasions with similar symptoms prior to
moving to the defendant’s apartment.).
43
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994).
44
See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265-66 (4th Cir.
1999); Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999).
45
John’s Heating Service v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024 (Alaska 2002).
46
John’s Heating Service v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1036 (Alaska 2002)
(internal citation omitted); see also Asad v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d
726 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Perkins v. Origin Medsystems, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D. Conn.
2004); Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d 470, 498 (D.N.J. 2002); Keener v.
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The process of ruling out other causes is relatively easy
when there is a unique connection between an exposure and a
disease (a so-called signature disease)47 or, as in John’s
Heating, when there is a unique connection between an
exposure and a particular set of symptoms. The task becomes
more difficult when various causes do not produce
demonstrable differences in the disease.
The task becomes even more difficult when the causes of
the type of injury under investigation are not well understood.
When the etiology of an illness is not well understood, there
will be many idiopathic injuries. This raises an important
general point. Should courts permit experts to present
differential diagnosis testimony when the clear weight of
scientific evidence points to the fact that the substantial
majority of certain types of injuries are from unknown causes?
Logically, when this situation arises the best differential
diagnosis would be legally insufficient. For example, if, with
respect to some injury, we know that 5% of the cases are
caused by an exposure to a drug, 5% are caused by another
known cause, and 90% have no known cause, then even if a
differential diagnosis clearly excludes the other known cause it
remains the case that it is much more likely than not that the
cause in any individual case is not the drug.
Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc.,48 apparently
adopted this line of argument. Doe is one of a number of cases
involving the question of whether exposure to the mercury in
thimerosal, a preservative once used in vaccines and other
biologic products, is capable of causing autism in children.49
After excluding the plaintiff’s causal expert on general
causation grounds, the court made the following observation:
More troubling, however, is that Dr. Geier’s differential diagnosis
failed to acknowledge the one conclusion that is generally accepted
in the medical community with respect to the causation of autism,
which is, that its cause is genetic, but that the exact genetic
sequence of autism is unknown. . . . Although Dr. Geier apparently
Mid-Continent Cas., 817 So. 2d 347 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2002), writ denied, 825 So. 2d
1175 (La. 2002).
As the John’s Heating quote indicates, many factors may enter into a
differential diagnosis, including individual and family history, genetic predispositions,
exposure to other known causes, and the results of various tests.
47
This is the situation with respect to asbestos exposure and mesothelioma.
48
Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 465, 477-78 (M.D.
N.C. 2006).
49
See Snyder ex rel. Snyder v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 88 Fed. Cl.
706, 711 (2009); Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 158, 163 (2009).
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has considered a number of specific genetic disorders in performing
his differential diagnosis, the Court finds that his failure to take into
account the existence of such a strong likelihood of a currently
unknown genetic cause of autism serves to negate Dr. Geier’s use of
the differential diagnosis technique as being proper in this instance.50

What is interesting about Doe is that its position is quite rare.
Courts do not generally rule against the admissibility of a
differential diagnosis on these grounds and note that even in
Doe the passage was a bit of an afterthought, perhaps even
dicta. Recall, the court had already concluded that the plaintiff
could not prevail on general causation.
In sum, the high exclusion rate in toxic torts disguises
the fact that these cases address two separate issues, general
and specific causation. With respect to general causation, the
courts rely heavily on the available science to exclude expert
testimony. However, with respect to specific causation, courts
are, on balance, much more lenient. If an expert follows normal
procedures, i.e., collects a medical history of the patient and the
patient’s family, conducts appropriate laboratory and
diagnostic tests, and gives consideration to other causes, and if
there is no a glaring alternative cause that seems far more
likely to have caused the illness,51 courts are likely to admit
differential diagnosis testimony even though there simply are no
tests one can perform that will produce a quantified estimate as
to whether an injury is the result of one cause or another.52
IV.

ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS IN FORENSIC CASES

Prior to Daubert, the Frye “general acceptance” test was
used primarily in criminal cases.53 Courts excluded proffered
50

Ortho-Clinical, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (internal citations omitted).
See Newton v. Roche Laboratories, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
52
Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to
the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 209-10 (1992) (“Scientists know very
little about how, in a mechanistic sense, toxic substances cause disease such as cancer
or birth defects.”).
53
Indeed, nearly all Frye admissibility rulings that excluded expert
testimony were in the criminal area. Federal civil cases in which the Frye test was
employed to exclude testimony are extraordinarily rare. Kenneth Chesebro, Galileo’s
Retort, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1695 (1993) reports there were only two federal
appellate court opinions excluding civil evidence on Frye grounds prior to the lower
court Daubert decision. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16
(5th Cir. 1991) (employing Frye to determine that district court was within its
discretion to exclude medical expert’s testimony in civil case where that testimony was
not generally accepted within relevant scientific community), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1280 (1991) (using Frye to exclude epidemiological re-analysis studies in civil suit);
Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir.
51
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expert testimony in a few areas. The inadmissibility of lie
detector results is the most well known example.54 With respect
to most areas of forensic evidence, however, the courts
concluded that expert testimony met the general acceptance
standard.55 As pointed out by Paul Giannelli, the courts arrived
at this result by defining the relevant field of expertise as the
very group of individuals, e.g., handwriting analysts, whose
expertise was being judged.56 Unsurprisingly, this group
vouched for its own endeavor.57 Admissibility rulings did not
concern themselves with the quality of the evidence.
Daubert offered an opportunity to revisit these
admissibility decisions but by and large the pattern of liberal
admissibility decisions has not changed. Although federal
courts and state courts in jurisdictions that have adopted
Daubert often pay lip-service to that test, it is rarely used to
exclude forensic evidence experts.58
There are, undoubtedly, many reasons why courts apply
liberal standards when considering forensic evidence.59
However, I believe an important factor is the same one that
leads to liberal admissibility rulings in toxic tort, specific
causation determinations. There is very little hard scientific
evidence upon which to base opinions. As a consequence,
similar to the specific causation situation, the courts rely on

1984) (employing Frye to overturn district court’s admission of type of “voice stress
analysis” in civil diversity case involving insurance claim, but failing to consider
propriety of imposing Frye in civil case).
54
See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 35.
55
See 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 1:35.
56
Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
57
Id. at 1203.
58
For examples of this reluctance to apply Daubert factors, see 4 FAIGMAN ET
AL., supra note 35, at § 32 (fingerprint identification), § 33 (handwriting identification),
§ 36 (bitemark identification).
59
They include: a) bias in favor of the state in criminal prosecutions, b) the
quality of criminal defense attorney and their limited resources, c) the negative effects
on judges if they refuse to permit the state to present its experts (a consideration that
may be particularly relevant to elected judges, d) the long history of admissibility of
forensic evidence which creates its own inertia to keep things the way they have
always been, and e) judicial belief of the claims of forensic experts. For a very useful
discussion of why lower courts may actually believe forensic experts despite the limited
empirical evidence supporting some of their claims, see Michael J. Saks, Explaining the
Tension Between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of
Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts’ (Seeming) Rejection of Same, 3
EPISTEME 329 (2008).
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expert testimony that is not much more than a clinical
judgment from an experience based expert.60
Before I expand on this point, I should be clear on
another. I do not mean to suggest that the causal issue in the
forensic context is exactly the same as the issue in toxic torts.
Within the context of forensic experts, the distinction between
general and specific causation is rarely, if ever made. We
simply do not think about forensic evidence in that way. Indeed,
the terms “general causation” and “specific causation” seem to be
terms of art that are restricted to the toxic tort context.
Nevertheless, one can think of forensic evidence in these
terms. From one point of view, the connection between general
causation and specific causation is easier in forensic cases. The
problem in toxic torts is to determine which of several things
caused the plaintiff’s disease. This problem does not exist in
forensics. Latent fingerprints are “caused” by fingers, not some
other source. In the jargon of toxic torts, latent prints are a
“signature disease” cause by human fingers. This is true of
even the most suspect forms of forensic evidence, e.g., bite
marks. It is, in fact, the existence of this relationship that gives
much forensic evidence testimony its initial plausibility.
Another, perhaps more useful way to compare the
causal question in toxic tort and forensic cases is to think of
each individual as a source of many latent prints. That person
is, in the jargon of toxic torts, an entity that is a “general
cause” of some prints. The individual problem is determining
whether this person, rather than all the other plausible sources
of the print, is the “cause” of a particular print.61 From this
60

See Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic
Knowledge Claims in the Post-Daubert Era, 43 TULSA L. REV. 263, 276 (2007); Lyn
Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Experiential or Scientific Expertise, 7 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 143 (2008).
61
From this point of view, the forensic evidence problem is similar to the
problem that arises in tort when we have an indeterminate defendant. This issue was
brought into starkest relief in the DES cases. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal.3d 588, 601 (1980). In those cases, through no fault of their own, the plaintiffs
could not identify which drug company manufactured the drug sold to their mothers
many years earlier. In the Sindell case the court solved the plaintiff’s proof problem by
forcing defendants to prove that they did not sell the prescription or be liable for a
share of the plaintiff’s injury based on each defendant’s market share of sales of DES in
the relevant market. This solution has rarely escaped the narrow confines of the DES
cases, and generally a plaintiff simply cannot prevail in this circumstance. Id.
A related problem arises when many defendants contributed some part of
the total dose of a harmful substance that caused the plaintiff’s injury. This issue
arises in asbestos cases. One solution is to ask the jury to assign liability to each
defendant based on the percentage of the total risk of injury generated by that
defendant’s product. Thus, if a defendant made 10 percent of the total asbestos to
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perspective, the individual causation questions are parallel.
Can we detect which agent caused a disease by looking at a
patient’s illness? Can we detect which finger left a print by
looking at the latent print?
In both areas, the accuracy with which we can make
this judgment turns on the quality and quantity of our general
understanding of a phenomenon and our ability to translate
this knowledge to a judgment about the individual case. In the
forensics arena, as in the toxic tort arena, the courts must try
to answer a question without the benefit of much underlying
general scientific knowledge. The problem in toxic torts is that
the base rate information supplied by epidemiological research
and, to a lesser extent, animal studies, is not easily translated
into information about causation in the particular case. The
problem in most forensics situations is in one sense more
fundamental: with the exception of DNA testing, there is very little
base rate information at all. In the next few paragraphs, I illustrate
the problem using the example of fingerprint identification.62
A.

Fingerprint Identification

The primary method used to examine fingerprints in the
United States is called ACE-V, an acronym which stands for
the stages of the examination: Analysis-ComparisonEvaluation-Verification.63 As described by Haber and Haber,64
the ACE-V examination proceeds as follows.
At the Analysis Stage, “the fingerprint examiner looks
at a latent fingerprint and decides whether it contains
sufficient quantity and quality of detail so that it exceeds the

which the plaintiff was exposed, it would ideally be assigned 10 percent of the liability.
See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953, 957 (1997).
It is important to note that in both the Sindell and the Rutherford
situations the courts are prepared to adopt this solution only in the cases where every
one of the defendants has breached a duty to the plaintiff. Obviously, this is never the
situation in criminal cases. One potential defendant “breached a duty” to the plaintiff,
but all the other potential defendants are innocent.
On rare occasions, one might have a specific causation issue in forensics
which is similar to that in toxic torts. For example, a case might arise where the
question was whether a bite mark was caused by human or animal teeth.
62
I chose fingerprint identification because it is an area of forensics with
high face validity. If a problem exists here, a fortiori, it exists in other areas such as
handwriting analysis.
63
Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint
Evidence Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 87 (2008).
64
Id.
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standard for value.”65 If it does not, no further steps are possible
and the prints are rejected.66
If a latent print does meet the value standard, the
examiner collects as much evidence as possible on “the nature
of the surface on which [the print] was deposited, the amount
and direction of pressure used in touch[ing the surface, and the
way] . . . in which the ridge details of the [print] were transferred
onto the surface,” e.g., sweat.67 All of this is employed in the next
step to account for inevitable distortions between the latent print
and the print against which it is being compared.68
For prints that do meet the value standard, the
examiner chooses a feature-rich area of the latent print.69
“Within this area, he selects the particular features along the
various ridge paths in the latent print, in their spatial locations
relative to one another . . . .”70
In the Comparison Stage, the examiner attempts to
ascertain whether one of the suspects’ fingers made the latent
print by comparing the same area that he chose for the latent
print.71 Failure to find a correspondence that cannot be
accounted for by factors such as distortion lead to an exclusion
of that finger.72 This, of course, is the most likely result. If there
are sufficient points of similarity and no excluding differences,
the examiner will return to the latent print, examine another
area of the latent print, and then again compare this area to
the exemplar print.73 This process will be repeated until “all the
features of the latent print have been compared.”74 If there are
sufficient points of comparison and no excluding differences,
the examiner proceeds to the Evaluation Stage.75
“In [the Evaluation Stage], the examiner applies a
sufficiency standard to the amount of corresponding agreement
between the latent and the exemplar [print].”76 “If the amount
of corresponding agreement exceeds the sufficiency standard,
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 90 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 91.
Id.
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then the examiner concludes that the crime scene latent print
[was made by the suspect finger].”77 (In the language of latent
print examiners, “the crime scene latent print can be
individuated to the suspect.”)78 “If the amount of agreement
does not reach th[is] standard,” the examiner may say the
comparison is inconclusive.79 This sufficiency standard can be
numeric, i.e., there are X number of points of similarity
between the latent print and the exemplar.80 Or, the standard
can be experiential, “based on the individual examiner’s
training and experience.”81 Fingerprint examiners in the United
States rarely use a numeric standard.82
In the Verification Stage, which is done in larger
laboratories, after an examiner has concluded that the latent
print did come from a suspect finger, a second examiner
confirms or disconfirms the conclusion.83 The verification is not
a complete re-analysis, but rather is a review of the evidence
and the conclusions of the examiner.84
As cautious and thorough as this sounds, apparently
there is no peer-reviewed study testing the validity of the ACEV method.85 Indeed, such a study would be difficult to conduct
because the details of how an examiner is to proceed are left
quite open ended.86 As a consequence, here is what a recent
National Academy of Science (the “National Academy”) report
on the state of forensic evidence has to say about ACE-V.
[T]he assessment of latent prints from crime scenes is based largely
on human interpretation. Note that the ACE-V method does not
specify particular measurements or a standard test protocol, and
examiners must make subjective assessments throughout. In the
United States, the threshold for making a source identification is
deliberately kept subjective, so that the examiner can take into
account both the quantity and quality of comparable details. As a

77

Id.
Id. at 91.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 91.
82
Id. at 102.
83
Id. at 91.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 95.
86
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 139 (2009).
78
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result, the outcome of a friction ridge analysis is not necessarily
repeatable from examiner to examiner . . . .87
This subjectivity is intrinsic to friction ridge analysis, as can be seen
when comparing it with DNA analysis. For the latter, 13 specific
segments of DNA (generally) are compared for each of two DNA
samples. Each of these segments consists of ordered sequences of the
base pairs, called A, G, C, and T. Studies have been conducted to
determine the range of variation in the sequence of base pairs at
each of the 13 loci and also to determine how much variation exists
in different populations. From these data, scientists can calculate
the probability that two DNA samples from different people will
have the same permutations at each of the 13 loci.
By contrast, before examining two fingerprints, one cannot say a
priori which features should be compared. Features are selected
during the comparison phase of ACE-V, when a fingerprint examiner
identifies which features are common the two impressions and are
clear enough to be evaluated. Because a feature that was helpful
during a previous comparison might not exist on these prints or
might not have been captured in the latent impression, the process
does not allow one to stipulate specific measurements in advance, as
is done for a DNA analysis. Moreover, a small stretching of distance
between two fingerprint features, or a twisting of angles, can result
from either a difference between the fingers that left the prints or
from distortions from the impression process. For these reasons,
population statistics for fingerprints have not been developed and
friction ridge analysis relies on subjective judgments by the
examiner. Little research has been directed toward developing
population statistics, although more would be feasible.88

As the National Academy report notes, population
statistics are a perquisite to fully quantifying the diagnosticity
of an observed set of fingerprint characteristics. If the
characteristics are rare, then a reported match is more
diagnostic of the claim that two prints came from a common
source.89 For example, in DNA testing, the random match
probability, i.e., the frequency with which a genetic profile
exists in the population, captures the diagnosticity of a match.
Developing population statistics for fingerprints will not
be an easy task. We do not have a “map” of fingerprints in the
same sense that we have a map of the human genome. Thus,
87

Id. at 139-40. The report cites recent research that suggests even
“experienced examiners do not necessarily agree with even their own past conclusions
when the task is presented in a different context” at a later time. See id. (citing Itiel E.
Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600
(2006)).
88
Id.
89
See Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests:
What They Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1078 (2008).
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we do not know the frequency of different patterns in the way
that we know the variations in the sequencing of base pairs in
specific loci. Nor do we have strong evidence of the
independence of patterns.90
Even if we were to have such base rate information, we
would find it to be of less practical use than it is in DNA
testing. In most cases, DNA matches are made with sufficient
DNA that we can make comparisons at multiple locations.91 The
DNA samples contain complete or nearly complete information
about the sequences of base pairs at multiple loci.
Metaphorically, the samples are nearly “perfect prints.” The
problem in the real world of fingerprint identification arises
when the latent print is far, far from perfect. The impression
left by a given finger will differ every time because of
variations in pressure and the impression medium.
Given this reality, the National Academy report
proposes some other steps that could be taken to move the area
toward a sounder scientific footing.92 For example, the field
could conduct research on the variables that effect latent print
differences.93 Note that these steps are designed to improve our
general understanding of fingerprint marks, a general
causation-like issue. Even more helpful in the short run would

90

Independence means that the sequence of base pairs at one location is
independent of the sequence at another location. When independence exists, one can
use the product rule to determine the overall probability of a match. Thus if a
particular sequence at location one occurs in 5% of the population and a particular
sequence at location two occurs in 10% of the population, the probability of observing
the same sequence at both loci is 5% times 10% or 0.5%. In the early years of DNA
testing it was not clear that the independence assumption was valid, causing some to
propose a more conservative rule when combining probabilities. See Richard Lempert,
DNA, Science and the Law: Two Cheers for the Ceiling Principle, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 41,
42-43 (1993).
91
The widespread adoption of Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test
protocols has greatly reduced the occasion where the sample quantity of DNA is
insufficient for a proper analysis. See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 30:44.
92
Some efforts have been made to examine the ability of automated
fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) to identify the source of simulated latent
prints. See Simon Cole et al., Beyond the Individuality of Fingerprints: A Measure of
Simulated Computer Latent Print Source Attribution Accuracy, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY &
RISK 165, 170 (2008). Insofar as it reduces the role of subjective judgment, there is
much to be said for this approach. See Itiel E. Dror & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Use of
Technology in Human Expert Domains: Challenges and Risks Arising from the Use of
Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensics, LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4, available at http://lpr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/
reprint/mgp031v1.pdf); David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology and Other
Abject Lessons from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 980 (2008).
93
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 105-06.
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be research on reliability.94 The most frequently suggested way
to achieve better reliability estimates is to engage in serious
proficiency testing. Such testing would provide a better
estimate of the error rate (the frequency of false positives and
false negatives) associated with reported matches.95
Some fingerprint identification proficiency tests have
occurred, but they have not used rigorous double blind
methodology and most observers agree that the tests have not
involved challenging partial prints.96 Nearly everyone agrees
that reliability is very high when the examination involves
good-quality impressions of all ten fingers.97 The critical
question is how far we can move from this best-case situation
before identification accuracy begins to deteriorate. Proficiency
tests employing challenging partials address this question.
Without some studies along these lines we are unable to assess the
reliability of expert assertions in different identification settings.98
Most courts have not been sensitive to the importance of
distinguishing among different identification situations. With
very, very few exceptions, they have admitted fingerprint
identifications.99 Courts have refused to conduct Daubert
hearings,100 have implicitly reversed the burden of persuasion to
require the defendant to demonstrate that a fingerprint

94

The reliability of a reported match addresses the issue of whether two
reportedly matching prints actually do share a set of common characteristics. Is the
match a true match, or has the examiner made an error? See Koehler, supra note 89, at
1078 (citing Suzanne O. Kaasa et al., Statistical Inference and Forensic Evidence:
Evaluating a Bullet Lead Match, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2007)).
95
Under such a scheme, examiners would be sent prints to be analyzed. The
examiner would not know that the prints were part of a proficiency test and the examiner
would not be provided other evidence of a suspect’s guilt or innocence. Such double blind
testing is standard practice in other areas such as clinical trials for new drugs.
96
See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification:
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 135 (2008)
(quoting a Scotland Yard fingerprint expert testifying in Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp.
2d 549, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
97
See Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert
Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 15, 68-69 (2004).
98
See Cole, supra note 37, at 273.
99
For a thorough discussion of the post-Daubert case law on the admissibility
of fingerprint evidence, see 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at §§ 33:3-:19. The
following paragraph borrows heavily from this discussion. Although the following
discussion focuses on federal court opinions, the states generally replicate this pattern.
See id. at § 33:19.
100
See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, No. CR. A. 99-238, 2001 WL 515213, at
*1 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001); United States v. Ambriz-Vasquez, 34 Fed. Appx. 356, 359
(9th Cir. 2002).
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identification is not reliable,101 have refused to focus on the
“task at hand” as required by Kumho Tire,102 have refused to
conduct an assessment of the evidence on fingerprint
reliability,103 have admitted expert testimony by relying on the
fact that other courts have admitted the testimony,104 have
relegated any concerns about validity to weight, not
admissibility,105 and in general have lowered the bar to the level
necessary to admit fingerprint identification.106
The story is the same with respect to many other types
of forensic evidence. Courts often seem to simply mouth the
Daubert criteria without actually assessing whether the
proffered evidence meets these criteria.107 In sum, the critique of
judicial leniency toward forensic experts is well founded. But is
it any more lenient than proof of specific causation in toxic tort
cases? The next section compares the two areas.
101

United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171, 173 (4th Cir. 2001).
4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 33:6.
103
United States v. Havvard, 117 F.Supp.2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d,
260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
104
Havvard, 260 F.3d at 600; United States v. Frias, No. 01 Cr. 307, 2003 WL
352502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2003).
105
United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (D. Kan. 2002), aff’d,
349 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2003).
106
Id. A rare exception to this landslide of opinions admitting fingerprint
evidence was United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
However, Judge Pollak later withdrew his initial opinion excluding fingerprint
evidence and admitted the evidence. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549
(E.D. Pa. 2002); see also United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003)
(Michael, J., dissenting).
107
Faigman, supra note 8, at 718; see also Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12
S.W.3d 258, 260-64 (Ky. 1999). For a discussion of Johnson, see Michael J. Saks,
Protecting Factfinders From Being Overly Misled, While Still Admitting Weakly
Supported Forensic Science into Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 609 (2007):
102

In a challenge to the admissibility of microscopic hair identification evidence,
the Kentucky Supreme Court purported to be conducting an analysis under
that state’s version of Daubert. The record was devoid of research studies on
the validity of asserted microscopic hair identification expertise, so the Court
relied entirely on the “general acceptance” criterion of Daubert. But there was
no evidence of that in the record either. So the Court turned to its own earlier
(pre-Daubert) Kentucky decisions in search of general acceptance of
microscopic hair comparison. But not one of the earlier cases admitting
testimony on hair identification said a word about general acceptance of the
technique. So the Court stated that it would assume that those earlier
decisions must have: addressed the question, conducted an appropriate
inquiry, and found general acceptance. How else could they have admitted
the testimony?
Id. at 619-20. In point of fact, the Frye test had not been adopted or even mentioned in
Kentucky cases until after those cases were decided. As Saks notes, “this Court had to
create out of thin air the basis for admission under the weakest of the Daubert prongs.”
Id. at 620.
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COMPARING TOXIC TORT AND FORENSIC ADMISSIBILITY
STANDARDS

I do not wish to argue that there are no differences in
admissibility standards in toxic tort cases and in admissibility
standards in forensic cases. There are. Many tort plaintiffs lose
their lawsuit at the summary judgment stage after the court
has excluded their causation experts. Only very rarely does the
same fate befall the state in criminal prosecutions.108 However,
the differences disguise an underlying similarity that is
revealed once we control for the quantity and quality of the
scientific evidence available to address various causal
questions. Plaintiff experts are excluded in toxic tort cases
largely because of an inability to show general causation,
something about which there is often a body of empirical
evidence. However, when there is relatively little evidence,
which occurs most frequently with respect to proof of specific
causation, the courts set a threshold that is not much higher
than that required in the forensic area to prove a particular
defendant left some piece of trace evidence at a crime scene.
This does not mean that experts who testify about
individual causation always have little or no support for the
position they espouse. Quite frequently, they do. The point is
well made by Professor Mnookin with respect to fingerprint
evidence.
[T]he reality is that there are plenty of cases where the totality of the
evidence—including but not limited to a fingerprint identification—
leaves little practical doubt about ground truth. Fingerprint
identification’s 100 years of use in a variety of contexts does not come
close to answering all the questions about precisely how accurate it is,
or how commonly identification errors are made, but it does provide
some degree of prima facie evidence of its general validity.109

The same may be said for many differential diagnoses. Often
the probabilistic evidence that a particular substance caused a
particular illness may be very high and we can state with
substantial certainty that one caused the other even in the
absence of a mechanistic understanding of how this occurs.110
108

Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining
“Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 322 (2000).
109
See Mnookin, supra note 96, at 134.
110
I certainly do not mean to suggest that such probabilistic evidence is never
a sufficient substitute for a mechanistic understanding. This argument is similar to the
cigarette industry’s long standing argument that the causal link between tobacco usage
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The point is not that all such testimony is unreliable
(although in certain areas such as bite marks, a large
percentage of the testimony may be of very low validity).
Rather, the point is that the threshold for admissibility is low
and, in part, this is a judicial response to the fact that there is
little useful quantified empirical evidence courts may employ to
establish a higher admissibility baseline.111

and lung cancer was not established because we did not understand the exact way in
which tobacco smoke caused cancer. In the case of cigarettes, where the relative risk of
lung cancer among serious smokers is approximately five-fold that of non smokers,
neither common sense nor law requires mechanistic causation to assert that more likely
than not any particular lung cancer of a long-time smoker was caused by their habit.
111
In the absence of direct empirical evidence, following a set routine and
expressing conclusions in a formulistic way takes on increased importance. In the toxic
tort arena, the best differential diagnoses involve factors such as: a patient
examination and patient history, diagnostic tests, laboratory tests, tissue samples and
biopsies, and genetic testing. See 3 FAIGMAN, ET AL., supra note 35, § 21:31-:39. Failure
to structure one’s testimony along these lines or a failure verbally to give full
consideration to all of the data may lead to the exclusion of the expert’s testimony. See,
e.g., Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 2001); Viterbo v. Dow
Chem. Co. 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987).
Likewise, fingerprint expertise may be rejected if the state makes no effort
to explain and justify an examiner’s conclusion. See Jacobs v. Gov’t of the Virgin
Islands, 53 Fed. Appx. 651 (3d Cir. 2002). The recent emergence of the ACE-V
terminology for fingerprint analysis may be understood from this perspective. Professor
Cole notes that the terminology was first adopted after the Daubert opinion. “Given the
fortuitous timing, one might suspect that the term was adopted in the wake of Daubert
to lend forensic fingerprint identification a scientific patina.” Simon A. Cole,
Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings From Jennings to LleraPlaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1236 n.201 (2004).
Wrapping testimony in the rhetoric of a methodology does not, of course,
make it more reliable. As Professor Cole notes with respect to ACE-V, “[I]t indicates
little more than looking at two objects and determining, subjectively, whether they
originate from a common source, and then repeating this process.” Id.
Professor Mnookin argues that courts should not settle for explanations of
method standing alone.
Indeed, the history of the identification sciences in court shows a repeated
and dangerous pattern: when judges are provided with an intuitively
appealing description of a science of ‘matching,’ they frequently let poorly
specified explanations of method substitute for a more searching assessment
of validity and reliability . . . .
Judges, therefore, would be well advised to focus on the degree of testing
associated with the claims made by experts rather than emphasizing whether
the expert has offered a seemingly plausible explanation of her technique and
her conclusion.
Jennifer Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of
Forensic Science, 5 EPISTEME 343, 349-51 (2008).
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CONTEXTUALISM AND THE LAW’S APPROACH TO
INDIVIDUAL CAUSATION

Many critics of the lax admissibility standards in
forensic cases call upon the courts to tighten things up. At the
same time, some call upon courts to ease admissibility
standards in civil cases. A first reaction to these two requests
might be that the courts should search for one appropriate
standard that applies to all admissibility questions. A single
standard might be epistemologically more satisfying, but given
the social objectives of the law, in my opinion, it would be ill
advised. A brief discussion of the standard epistemological
approach to knowledge will help us to see why this is the case.
The standard approach to the question of “when . . . it is
proper to say someone knows something . . . involves the
interplay of three primary variables: belief, truth, and
justification.”112 Belief is a person’s subjective position concerning
the truth of a proposition. Truth is the reality of the proposition
independent of belief. Justification involves the quality of the
reasons for a belief. To count as knowledge, something must be
believed to be true, it must be true, and a person’s belief that it
is true must be justified. In the absence of belief, we have
ignorance. In the absence of truth, we have error. In the absence
of appropriate justification, we have mere opinion.113 What is
most noteworthy about this standard approach is that its main
concern is not knowledge per se but justification. Even correct
beliefs without justification are not knowledge.
For courts, the relevant question is what level of
justification should be required before experts are permitted to
testify? Clearly, the level must be sufficient to qualify the
person as an expert, i.e., in the jargon of evidence law, a person
must be in possession of knowledge (and justification for that
knowledge) that is beyond the ken of the lay person. But
beyond that, how much? Presumably, a single admissibility
standard would require the same level of justification from all
experts. But from where would such a standard come?
Earlier in the article, I compared legal and scientific
conventions. I noted that three relevant scientific conventions
112

D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and
Leviathan: Law Enforcement-Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process, 2003
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1023, 1024.
113
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
TO EPISTEMOLOGY 16-19 (2001).
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are: a) a search for general and theoretical propositions, b)
doing so by employing the methods and techniques accepted by
one’s field, and c) an attitude of agnosticism that encourages a
wait-and-see attitude. I compared these to the relevant legal
conventions which: a) often focus on the specific event, and b)
push witnesses toward arriving at a conclusion.
The point I wish to make here is that the second
element in scientific conventions, a commitment to the methods
and techniques of inquiry accepted by one’s field, has no direct
parallel in legal conventions. Of course, the law has
conventional techniques it uses to arrive at causal conclusions.
Substantial parts of the law of evidence could be understood in
this way. But ultimately when it comes to methods and
techniques of acquiring knowledge in the first instance, the law
has no methodology of its own. It simply borrows the relevant
scientific methodology. Presumably, the law could be
indifferent to the methods and techniques used by an
investigator or even ask the investigator to forego these
techniques when appearing in court. However, most postDaubert courts are respectful of these methods. Many
successful Daubert challenges turn on the argument that the
expert failed to use the methods deemed to be appropriate by
those in his field when arriving at a causal conclusion.114
Even if the courts were inclined to establish a single
level of justification for causal assertions, what should it be? In
some situations, raising the bar may systematically guarantee
victory for one side, a result many courts find to be undesirable
as a general principle.115 If raising the bar has problems, how
about lowering the bar? This does not lead inevitably to a
victory for one side, but it has its own problems. If experts are
not to use their normal methods for determining causation,
what are they to use? Because the question has no obvious

114

One need look no further than Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999). Referring to the plaintiff’s expert, the court said, “Indeed, no one has
argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for Michelin, would have concluded
in a report to his employer that a similar tire was similarly defective on grounds
identical to those upon which he rested his conclusion here.” Id. at 157.
115
In the toxic tort area, opinions that require the plaintiff to have
epidemiological evidence in order to prove causation note that this is not always
necessary. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 718 (1997). One
suspects that a similar concern underlies many lenient forensic opinions. The court
may fear that raising the bar too high would make it impossible for the state to prove
its case in many criminal trials.
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answer, courts are also reluctant to adopt this position.116
Where does this leave us?
The epistemological approaches most congenial to the
standard legal position on what constitutes adequate
justification are contextual approaches to knowledge.117 The
central idea behind contextualism is that the standards for
making knowledge attributions vary depending on the context
within which they are made.118 The rules of evidence are applied
in a way that is consistent with the contextualist’s
fundamental observation that the level of justification we
require for something to count as knowledge and coincidently
for someone to be epistemically responsible in asserting a
116

I attended a Court of Federal Claims conference in November of 2008. One of
the panels was on compensation under the National Vaccine Act. The central topic of the
panel was proof of causation under the Act. A number of attorneys from the petitioners’
bar argued for a relaxed standard of causation that would be different from “scientific”
causation. Those in favor of this position argued that a medical theory combined with
temporal order should be sufficient to prove causation. If one suffered an injury shortly
after being vaccinated and some theory supported a causal connection then one should
recover under the Act. In support of this position, the petitioners cited Althen v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., which set forth three criteria for recovery under the Act: (1)
medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury; (2) a logical sequence
of cause and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury; and (3) a
proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and injury.
In response to this argument, a special master in a thimerosal case before
the court responded:
Althen requires more than merely a medical theory. Petitioners must offer a
biologically plausible medical theory. . . .
What is missing from petitioners’ formulation of the medical theory
prong of Althen is the requirement that such a theory be reliable.
Under the Vaccine Act, a special master may determine the reliability of
a medical theory by considering the framework established by Daubert. See
Terran v. Sec’y, HHS, 195 F.3d 1302, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (framework
established by Daubert for evaluating the reliability of evidence appropriate
for use by special masters). Daubert requires that an opinion be supported by
something more than subjective belief; it must be grounded “in the methods
and procedures of science.”
Snyder v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-162V (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009) (internal
citations omitted), available at http://www.autism-watch.org/omnibus/snyder.pdf.
117
David Lewis, Elusive Knowledge, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 503
(Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim eds., 2000); Keith DeRose, Solving the Skeptical Problem,
in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 482 (Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim eds., 2000);
Michael Williams, Epistemological Realism, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 536
(Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim eds., 2000). Cranor advocates a similar position in the
area of regulation. See CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND LAW ch. 5 (1993).
118
On the different forms of contextualism, compare Steward Cohen,
Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery,
in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 517 (Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim eds., 2000) with
David Lewis, Elusive Knowledge, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 503.
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belief, varies according to the context within which the belief is
held and expressed. Within the confines of the present
discussion, the most important context is the quantity and
quality of the available evidence.119
The contextual nature of legal epistemology is both a
strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it balances
two important legal goals. Earlier in the article, when listing
differences between scientific and legal conventions, I noted
that the law needs to arrive at a conclusion. A wait-and-see
attitude that advises us to bide our time until we arrive at a
greater level of justification for a belief may suffice in science,
but not in the courtroom. Competing against the goal of
resolving cases is the goal of arriving at the factually correct
outcome. As Federal Rule of Evidence 102 states, evidentiary
rules shall be construed toward the end of ascertaining the
truth.120 Acquiescing to a low level of justification when in fact
experts can do better is to insure more incorrect outcomes than
are necessary. A contextual approach balances these objectives.
If, as Aquinas teaches us, prudence is the first virtue,
contextualism is indeed a virtue.121 And as a practical matter
this approach permits the law to sidestep difficult philosophical
questions concerning knowledge and get on with the business
of deciding cases.122
However, if the contextual approach’s flexibility is its
strength, it is also its potential weakness. Without more, it
offers no independent standard by which courts may measure
the twin problems of epistemological adequacy: when is the

119

In this article, I do not propose to provide a complete review of the many
ways in which courts adopt a contextual approach. One example, however, might be in
order. In the rather well known handwriting analysis, United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880
F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), Judge McKenna was met with a defense challenge that
the state’s expert should be excluded because there was little or no scientific support for
the reliability of his alleged expertise. The judge concluded that if the Daubert standard
were applied, the state’s expert should be excluded. Rather than take this step, the judge
concluded that Daubert did not apply to “skilled” experts. Here, the key point is that the
court invents a special category of expert with a special admissibility standard precisely
because it recognizes that the standard to which experts were held to in Daubert would
lead to the exclusion of the state’s document examiner.
120
FED. R. EVID. 102.
121
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE CARDINAL VIRTUES: PRUDENCE, JUSTICE,
FORTITUDE, AND TEMPERANCE (Richard J Regan, trans., 2005).
122
One is reminded of Sir Frederick Pollock’s famous aphorism that “The
lawyer cannot afford to adventure himself with philosophers in the logical and
metaphysical controversies that beset the idea of cause.” SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE
LAW OF TORTS 36 (11th ed. 1920).
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admissibility bar set too high and, my primary concern in this
article, when is the bar set too low?123
The best answer to date, and an answer consistent with
a contextual approach, has been advanced by Professor Nance124
and Professor Mnookin.125 Courts should require a level of
justification that is as good as practicably possible. Assuming
such a standard is as good as we can do, what does it
practically mean with respect to individual causation evidence
in toxic tort cases and many types of forensic evidence?
Importantly, does it condemn us to perpetually accepting a low
threshold when there is little available science? I believe that if
we properly understand the nature of the contextual approach,
the answer is no. Allow me to elaborate.
If the contextual approach tells courts to require a level
of justification that is as good as practicably possible, how
should courts understand the context within which to apply
this standard? Should the relevant context only be the case at
hand and the evidence available at that moment in time, or
should we take a longer view? If we focus solely on the case at
hand, that is, if we set the level of necessary justification to
reflect the state of knowledge at the moment a particular case
is being tried, we may find ourselves permanently settling for
relatively little by way of justification.126 If, on the other hand,
123

With respect to the former question, at least in those areas where experts
employ their expertise outside the courtroom, I believe the best answer is to require
experts to use the same intellectual rigor they employ in their day-to-day work. See
Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539 (2007). This means
that even in the same general area of litigation, e.g. toxic torts, the courts may require
more justification when there is substantially more evidence available. This,
apparently, is what courts in fact generally do. See David L. Faigman et al., How Good
is Good Enough? Expert Evidence under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
645 (2000).
124
“The best that is reasonably available should be admitted, at least so far as
the reliability requirement of Rule 702 is concerned.” Dale Nance, Reliability and the
Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL. L. REV. 191, 241 (2003).
125
“One appropriate focal point for the judge, it seems to me, ought to be
whether the expert evidence on offer is as reliable as it can reasonably be, considering
the particular context and circumstances.” Mnookin, supra note 96, at 133.
126
This does not mean courts will settle for anything. For example, under
some fact patterns even the relatively lenient standard prevalent in specific causation
cases may be insurmountable. Consider, for example, Newton v. Roche Labs., Inc., 243
F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Tex. 2002). In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that exposure to
Accutane induced their child’s schizophrenia. Excluding the differential diagnosis
testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert, the court noted:
Dr. Rossiter’s conclusion that Accutane induced Candis’s schizophrenia relies
solely on the temporal proximity of her illness and her taking of the drug.
However, he does not adequately consider that Candis’s uncle and sister were
schizophrenic and her mother outwardly exhibited symptoms consistent with

2010]

APPLYING DAUBERT INCONSISTENTLY?

1397

we take a longer view, we concern ourselves with the impact of
present admissibility decisions on the body of foreseeable
future science and foreseeable future cases. I believe that the
better course of action is for courts to adopt this longer view.
The longer view is superior because it allows us to
recognize situations where the courts may be able to push
lawyers and, to the extent possible, science toward better
evidence. Moving the system toward better evidence can be
accomplished in two ways: by improving the mix of cases and by
and improving the underlying science. I discuss each in turn.
Improving the mix of cases. At any point in time, an
admissibility ruling produces a shadow effect on future cases. A
decision that admits expert testimony puts pressure on the
other side to mount a more complete case, by including
stronger opposing expertise. An exclusionary decision has the
opposite effect: it encourages proponents of such cases to
produce better evidence in the future.127
It may be that the nature of the science available on a
legal question and the quality of the expert opinions available
to report on that science are a constant. In this situation, a
higher standard can affect the mix of cases that are litigated,
but it cannot influence the quality of future cases. On the other
hand, if lawyers have not presented the best possible evidence
or have employed less well qualified experts, then a heightened
admissibility standard may improve the quality of evidence in
the same type of cases.128
Improving the science. In most situations, scientific
investigations are, at best, marginally influenced by what is
going on in court. When an area of litigation becomes a hot
topic, this may spur some research. For example, there is
evidence that the litigation surrounding the drug Bendectin
generated some research that would not otherwise have been

schizophrenia; Candis was severely malnourished in her early childhood; and
Candis’s natural father was sixty years old at the time of her birthCall of
which Dr. Rossiter agrees are considered risk factors for the natural onset of
schizophrenia. Dr. Rossiter’s reaction to this evidence was only that Accutane
could also be a possible contributing cause.
Id. at 683.
127

Because this article focuses on two areas where admissibility decisions are
lax, I focus my attention on the effect of tightening admissibility standards.
128
There is some evidence that this may have happened in some civil cases.
Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in
Federal Civil Cases Since Daubert, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 251, 298-99 (2002).
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published.129 Note, however, that it was the litigation itself, not
admissibility rulings per se that led to a better scientific
understanding of the issue at hand. The influence of legal
opinions on the production of science may be much stronger in
situations where the legal system itself is the primary market
for the information.130
All of this suggests that from the perspective of a longer
view, the specific causation in toxic tort cases and in forensic
cases is not the same. The impact of admissibility decisions is
likely to be greater in forensic cases.
In both areas, admissibility rulings may influence the
mix of cases. And marginally, they may influence the quality of
expertise presented in a particular trial.131 However, adverse
admissibility rulings are likely to have a larger effect on case
mix in the forensic setting. This is due to the social
organization of criminal prosecutions when compared to the
social organization of tort litigations. The latter is much less
well organized. Many tort claims are brought by small time
entrepreneurial tort lawyers. And even when the plaintiff’s bar
is more organized, as it often is with respect to mass torts,
there is a much more limited hierarchical structure. Individual
lawyers may bring relatively weak cases, unimpeded by
concerns for the larger body of claims. This is somewhat less
likely, at least within any given prosecutor’s office, where an
adverse ruling in a given case may impact other similar cases
brought in the future.
However, the most substantial difference between the
toxic and the forensic situation is in the ability of admissibility
rulings to influence the science itself. On the civil side, lawyers
might wish that scientists would do more research of direct
relevance to their cases and on rare occasions may even fund
129

“Jean Goldberg, author of a[n]. . . article on Bendectin and oral clefts,
noted, ‘if nothing had been happening over the drug . . . I doubt even whether I would
have written it up.’” JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT
LITIGATION 63 (1998) (quoting MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS:
THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 332 (1996)). Some research
may be mandated by the government. The largest animal study on Bendectin was
conducted at the specific request of the Food and Drug Administration. JOSEPH
SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL 63 (1998).
130
Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences: The Troubled Marriage Between
Science and the Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 16 (2009).
131
Because the parties in some civil cases may have more resources than the
parties in a criminal trial, they may be in a better position to respond to an adverse
admissibility ruling by seeking out better experts and better existing data in
subsequent cases. However, they may not be in a superior position when it comes to
generating new data.
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research, but by and large the scientists have their own agenda
over which the legal system has very little influence. This is
not the case with respect to many forensic areas. The legal
regime is the primary market for most types of forensic science.
Indeed, a substantial percentage of the people who work in this
area are the employees of legal entities. This community’s
failure to respond to legal signals will have a significant impact
on its livelihood. Moreover, the hierarchical structure of the
criminal justice system makes it relatively easy for the legal
system to organize a research strategy.132
Of course, if there are no scientific improvements to be
made, legal influence will come to naught.133 But as I noted in
the discussion of fingerprint identification,134 there are both
short run and long run ways to improve the quality of at least
some types of forensic evidence.
VII.

ADMISSIBILITY STRATEGIES FOCUSED ON THE LONGER
VIEW

Assuming that I am correct that admissibility decisions
can have a greater impact in forensic cases and that using
these decisions to push litigators in the direction of better

132

I do not want to leave the impression that admissibility decisions have no
potential influence on the quality of science in the toxic tort specific causation situation.
The path to improving the evidence in these cases is less well defined, but it is not nonexistent. Most significantly, the field of toxicogenomics offers the long run possibility that
we will be able to ascertain causation at the level of the individual case, radically
changing all specific causation testimony. See generally, Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and
Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 949 (2001); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2006); Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts:
Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671 (2007).
In the shorter run, genetic information may assist traditional specific
causation testimony by allowing experts to make better estimates that the various
possible causes of a disease played a role in the plaintiff’s case. See Gary E. Marchant,
Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2006).
In addition, one could envision some level of proficiency testing for specific
causation clinical judgments, but the reality is that this approach would be of very
limited value because in most cases of interest we simply do not know what caused the
plaintiff’s injury and, therefore, we would have no way of knowing if the expert’s
judgment was or was not correct.
133
For example, we might wish to have some type of proficiency testing in
toxic tort cases to ascertain the error rate of physicians making differential diagnoses.
Unfortunately, because there is no way to know the ground truth in toxic cases, i.e.
what did cause the plaintiff’s illness, proficiency testing is not a viable avenue of
investigation.
134
See supra Part IV.A.
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science is a good thing,135 how should courts go about this task?
There are several alternatives.
Immediately excluding whole areas of testimony. The
most radical approach to improving the quality of evidence
would be to declare a body of expertise inadmissible until the
proponent is able to produce better evidence. The temptation to
espouse this solution in the forensics area is fortified by the
lackadaisical, even obstructionist attitude of some practitioners
in the field. For example, the fingerprint examiner community
clings to a set of conceptual perspectives and professional
norms that discourage testing.136 Experts claim that their
technique has an error rate of zero. That is, they assert
certainty that when they declare a match they have matched
the latent print under investigation to the one and only person
in the entire world whose finger could have produced the
print.137 This position is the product of what Professors Saks
and Koehler label the “Individualization Fallacy,” which they
define as “placing an object in a unit category that consists of a
single unit. Individualization implies uniqueness.”138 The
135

I am far from the first person to argue for this approach. Professor
Mnookin makes the same point in the following passage.
Practically speaking, what should Daubert mean? How high a standard of
reliability ought trial judges to impose before permitting expert evidence
before a jury? One appropriate focal point for the judge, it seems to me, ought
to be whether the expert evidence on offer is as reliable as it can reasonably
be, considering the particular context and circumstances. Validity under
Daubert is not an on/off switch or an all or nothing proposition. It is, at least
to some degree, appropriately contextual and gradational: reliability ought to
be determined in relation to what information is available or what
information could or should have been available with reasonable effort.
Mnookin, supra note 96, at 133; see also Michael J. Risinger, Goodbye To All That, Or a
Fool’s Errand, By One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to
Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic Science” in General) and Learned to Love
Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447 (2007) (decrying
the willingness of some courts to admit every handwriting expert, regardless of the
justification for the expert’s position).
136
See Simon A. Cole, Comment on ‘Scientific Validation of Fingerprint
Evidence Under Daubert’, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 119 (2008).
137
See Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and Into the Fryeing Pan? Self
Validation, Meta-Expertise and the Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye
Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 453, 470 (2008); Mnookin, supra note 96, at
139. As Mnookin notes, an examiner might face a disciplinary sanction if she were to
testify that a match between the latent print and the comparison print was only
“likely” or “probable.” Id.
138
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in
Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 205 (2008). The fallacy leads to
statements such as a firearms examiner’s testimony that he is able to identify an
unknown weapon “to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.” United States
v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic

2010]

APPLYING DAUBERT INCONSISTENTLY?

1401

position is indefensible.139 It engenders a response that says, “if
they think that, then they should not be allowed to testify at all.”
Nevertheless, if the history of admissibility decisions in
the forensics area teaches us anything, it is that this approach
is not going to win favor with the courts. Elected judges might
well be committing re-election suicide by excluding key
evidence in a criminal case, but even the life-tenured federal
judiciary seems unwilling to take such a step.
Prohibiting testimony about individual causation.
Another option is to limit what experts can say with respect to
the particular case. There is some precedent for this solution.
When expert evidence on eyewitness identification is
permitted, it is generally restricted to general testimony about
the factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.140 Testimony about
whether or not a particular witness is correct is almost always
prohibited.141 A few courts have placed similar restrictions on
Science: Under the Microscope, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 315, 323-24 (2008). Similarly, we
have a forensic dentist’s testimony that the defendant “was the only person in the
world who could have inflicted the bite marks on [the murder victim’s] body.” Otero v.
Warnick, 614 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Mich. App. 2000). Fortunately for the plaintiff in Otero,
“the Detroit Police Crime Laboratory [later] released a supplemental report that
concluded that [he] was excluded as a possible source of DNA obtained from vaginal
and rectal swabs taken from [the victim’s] body.” Id. at 178. Otero is a civil suit by the
alleged offender against the dentist for gross negligence in his investigation and
testimony. Id. The court found that the dentist owed no duty to the plaintiff. Id. at 182.
For a discussion of the limits of civil suits as a method of holding expert witnesses
accountable, see Sanders, supra note 123, at 1562-72.
139
“Given the general lack of validity testing for fingerprinting, the relative
dearth of difficult proficiency tests, the lack of a statistically valid model of
fingerprinting and the lack of validated standards for declaring a match, such claims of
absolute, certain confidence in identification are unjustified.” Mnookin, supra note 96,
at 139.
140
See 2 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at § 16.
141
Ordinarily, experts on eyewitness identificationsCor the courts in which
they testifyClimit their testimony to the general principles derived from sound
empirical research. One exception appears to have been the testimony of Dr. Gerald
Loftus in United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001). Applying the general
finding of eyewitness research to the case at hand, according to the court:
Dr. Loftus stated that “it’s two to three times as likely that the identification
in the photo montage was made based on seeing the photograph four weeks
earlier than it was based on seeing the individual” who fled on October 14,
1998.
Id. at 334.
At least one treatise written by a well known investigator in the field made
the following comments concerning this type of testimony:
Without the transcript of the trial, it is impossible to say what literature Dr.
Loftus relied upon in making these conclusions regarding the likely accuracy
of a particular witness’ specific identification. To our knowledge, there is no
research support in the scientific literature for the validity of such clinical
opinions. In psychology, work on eyewitness identifications has, on the whole,
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handwriting experts. For example, the expert is permitted to
testify about general features that distinguish individual
handwriting, but not whether a particular signature is a forgery.142
As attractive as this alternative may be in some
criminal law contexts, were it ever to be used on the civil side it
would run directly into the plaintiff’s burden to prove specific
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. And simply
because there is no expert opinion on the individual causation
question does not mean that the jury can avoid the issue. It
must decide if this signature is a forgery or if the plaintiff’s
disease was caused by the defendant. We do not know enough
about jury decision making to know whether the quality of the
jury’s judgment would benefit from restricting expert testimony
in this way.
Exclude the worst testimony. This alternative assumes
that even in areas where there is little science we may still
distinguish levels of reliability, and that some testimony is so
unreliable that it fails a minimal threshold of reliability. One
way to think about such a situation is to conclude that the
expert is not an expert at all because the area of so-called
expertise does not exist. The “expert” witness is a lay witness
in disguise.
This approach has the advantage of incrementalism. One
does not need to make global pronouncements concerning a
particular type of expert testimony. For example, courts might
decide to admit handwriting expert testimony when the task is
to determine whether a signature is a forgery based on many
exemplars of known authentic signatures while excluding
testimony asserting the authorship of an attempted forgery.143
been of a kind that the field should be most proud. Indeed, no other topic has
garnered the same degree of attention among psychologists. It has been
unfortunate that courts have been slow to recognize the valuable insights this
research has to offer the law. But psychologists should be cautioned not to
overreach and offer opinions beyond what the data can support. Opinions
regarding the accuracy of individual identification appear to exemplify just
such overreaching.
2 FAIGMAN, ET AL., supra note 35, at § 16:2.
The fact that the expert witness research community opposes
particularistic testimony says a good deal about the gulf between clinicians and nonclinicians. The community of eyewitness identification experts is comprised largely of
experimental psychologists holding university professorships. Their expert culture
causes them to resist clinical judgments about a specific identification.
142
Paul Giannelli, supra note 138, at 319 n.30 notes that this was the position
of the courts in United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Neb. 2000)
and United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999).
143
See generally Risinger, supra note 135.
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The approach requires the courts to draw difficult lines
and thus it threatens to produce inconsistent outcomes in close
cases. Nevertheless, this may be the best that we can do in
areas where admissibility decisions will not have a foreseeable
impact on future cases or future science and the only goal
courts can hope to achieve is to change the mix of cases by
eliminating the weakest among them.
Excluding evidence at some point in the future. There is
an additional alternative that directly focuses on the longer
view. A court could declare that at some future time the
proponent of a type of evidence must present a better
justification for its reliability or risk the exclusion. A precise
timetable is not required. The court does not need to establish a
date certain when evidence will no longer be admitted without
better science. A vaguer nod to the future may well suffice. For
example, the court could tell the United States that it should ask
the F.B.I. to engage in significant, serious proficiency testing.144
For all cases coming before district courts two or three years
hence, experts testifying about a fingerprint identification
should be prepared to present the results of such tests or
indicate why this is not yet possible. The details of such an
opinion are less important than the general requirement that
the proponent work toward better justification for its position.
I know of no cases that have adopted this position. In
most situations, because of the very limited impact legal
opinions have on advancements in our causal understanding, it
would be unnecessary, inappropriate, or both. But in the
forensic area we find ourselves in a unique chicken-and-egg
situation. Because courts are committed to a contextual
approach to justification, they permit forensic expert testimony
with very little warrant. But this liberal approach
unnecessarily helps to perpetuate the status quo. Absent the
very unlikely prospect of a congressional mandate, the courts
are in the best position to move us toward a time when forensic
evidence stands on a more solid scientific foundation.

144

Because of the F.B.I.’s central role in the production of forensic evidence,
the greatest impact would come from a federal circuit court opinion sets a timetable for
improved evidence. One must be wary, of course, of the quality of research generated
by the very organization being asked to provide evidence. On this point, the F.B.I.’s
track record is anything but reassuring. For an insightful article on the less than
evenhanded nature of past law-enforcement sponsored research efforts, see D. Risinger
& Saks, supra note 112, at 1023. Given this record, a court might wish to stipulate in
advance that the research is undertaken by an independent entity.
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SUMMARY

Following the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, trial courts are
increasingly asked to assess the reliability of expert testimony.
Testimony that is deemed to be insufficiently reliable is
excluded. Many scholars argue that the courts apply the
reliability requirement inconsistently. One frequently
mentioned example is the use of liberal admissibility standards
in criminal law forensic evidence cases and the use of stringent
admissibility standards in tort law toxic tort cases. I argue that
this apparent inconsistency misses a key point.
Admissibility decisions in toxic tort cases appear to be
stringent because they address two separate causal questions:
evidence of general causation and evidence of specific
causation. When we focus on admissibility decisions dealing
exclusively with specific causation we see that courts adopt a
liberal standard. I compare this standard with liberal
admissibility standards in forensic cases, using fingerprint
evidence as an example.
In both situations, courts must decide a causal question
with respect to a particular individual and often the only
expertise available to address the issue is the judgment of a
clinician, be that clinician a medical doctor or a fingerprint
analyst. In neither situation does the expert have much by way
of quantified, empirical evidence to support her conclusion. It is
the relative lack of scientific information that causes the courts
to lower their admissibility standard in both these situations.
This liberal admissibility standard is consistent with
law’s contextual approach to knowledge. A contextual approach
varies the amount of justification necessary for an expert to
express an opinion depending on the quantity and quality of
evidence on the point. Admissibility standards with respect to
questions of individual causation are relatively liberal because
we have relatively little systematic scientific evidence on point.
Unfortunately, the contextual approach does not create
any incentive for the parties to improve the quality of evidence
even in situations where this might be possible. I argue that
some branches of forensics are such situations. When this
occurs, courts should view the relevant context from a
longitudinal perspective and adjust their admissibility rulings
accordingly.

